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Abstract—Securely pairing wearables with another device is the key to many promising applications. This paper presents
Touch-And-Guard (TAG), a system that uses hand touch as an intuitive manner to establish a secure connection between a wristband
wearable and the touched device. It generates secret bits from hand resonant properties, which are obtained using accelerometers and
vibration motors. The extracted secret bits are used by both sides to authenticate each other and then communicate confidentially. The
ubiquity of accelerometers and motors presents an immediate market for our system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our system
using an experimental prototype and conduct experiments involving 12 participants with 1440 trials. The results indicate that we can
generate secret bits at a rate of 7.15 bit/s, which is 44% faster than conventional text input PIN authentication.
Index Terms—Secure pairing, modal analysis, resonance, wearable
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1 INTRODUCTION
Interacting with devices in proximity is becoming an intrinsic
feature of today’s wearables. This need stems from many inno-
vative applications that provide unobtrusive experience to users.
Examples are wireless data transfer [2] that uploads health and
fitness data sampled by wearables to nearby smartphones or
tablets; and 2nd-factor authentication that authenticate the user
by proving the proximity of a smart device and a wearable owned
by the user.
These interactions normally involve sensitive information,
which fuels the need for wearables to secure communication
channels from malicious eavesdroppers. The de-facto approach to
setting up a secure link between two devices is based on reciprocal
information that is secretly shared by both sides. Due to the
broadcasting nature of wireless communications such as NFC and
Bluetooth, the pairing process is vulnerable to a malicious external
device [2]–[4]. Conventional cryptographic mechanisms need a
trusted authority for key management that is not always available
for wearables, as they are normally conntected in a peer-to-peer
fashion. In Bluetooth, the user can manually enter a PIN code
to establish a secured channel between two legitimate devices.
However, there is no convenience input interfaces for today’s
wearables. For example, wristbands do not have a touch screen
to enter PIN codes.
In this paper, we show that hand touch can be used as
an auxiliary channel to securely pair wristband wearables and
touched devices in an intuitive manner. Our design provide a
new way to generate secret bits without transmission. The hand
touch-based design has the merits in that the signal propagation is
confined with the hand and thus is suitable for secure pairing.
We design Touch-And-Guard (TAG), a system that generates
shared secret bits from hand touch using vibration motors and
accelerometers, which are equipped in almost all smartphones,
smartwatches, and wristband fitness trackers. Our observation is
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that the hand (including the wristband wearable) and the touched
device form a vibration system whose resonant properties can
be measured by the accelerometers in both devices. In contrast,
proximate eavesdroppers can barely learn the resonant properties
without physically touching the hand-device system. The resonant
properties of the system is highly sensitive to different hands,
devices, and how the hand touches the device. Consequently, the
rich context of touch postures, positions and hand differences
among users [5] leads to different resonant properties, thereby
providing enough randomness to generate secret bits.
The design of TAG is inspired by modal analysis [6] in
mechanical engineering. Modal analysis determines the structural
vibration properties of an object by exciting it with forces of
different frequencies. In our system, the secure pairing process is
initiated when a user touches a device. An actuator, e.g., a haptic
vibration motor, in the touched device or the wristband wearable
vibrates in a wide frequency range. Then, the vibration responses
of the hand and the device are captured by accelerometers in
the wearable and the device, respectively. Each side encodes the
captured vibration response to generate a bit sequence, which
is used as the shared secret for secure pairing. A challenge in
realizing our system is that the vibration responses at the wrist
and the device are not identical as they have different physical
characteristics. To extract common information from the vibration
responses, we model our system as a vibration system and analyze
resonant properties shared by both sides. Then, we carefully
design an encoding scheme to extract secret bits from the shared
resonant properties.
To validate our system, we conduct a series of experiments
with 12 study participants and 1440 trials. In our experiments, each
participant wears a wristband equipped with an accelerometer and
touches an object attached with an accelerometer and a vibration
motor. We test our system with various touch gestures, locations
of the wristband, and objects of different materials. The results
show that we can generate 12.52 secret bits on average in 1.75
seconds for each touch trial. The amount of secret information
generated per touch is comparable to a 4-digit Bluetooth PIN code
(13.2 bits). The bit rate is 7.15 bit/s, which is 44% faster than
the conventional PIN input [7]. The average bit mismatch rate is
merely 0.216%, and the successful rate of pairing is 97.7%, which
demonstrates the robustness of our system. Through empirical
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2study, we demonstrate that our system is resistant to microphone
and accelerometer-based eavesdroppers at various distances.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as fol-
lows.
• We develop TAG, a new and intuitive way to securely
pair wristband wearables with nearby devices. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to leverage resonant
properties for secure pairing.
• We propose an algorithm to extract reciprocal information
from hand resonance using a haptic vibration motor and
accelerometers. The reciprocal information can be used as
secret keys shared by the devices in physical contact with
the hand.
• We test our system on 12 participants with 1440 trials
in total, and conduct extensive experiments under various
conditions. The results show that we can generate secret
bits at a speed of 7.15 bit/s and achieve 97.7% success
rate in establishing a secure channel. Additionally, we
empirically demonstrate that acoustic and accelerometer-
based eavesdroppers (implemented using a smartphone) in
proximity can learn little information about the generated
bits.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin
in Section 2 with analytical and empirical studies about hand
resonance. Section 3 presents the system design of TAG. System
implementation and experimental design are described in Section
4, followed by performance evaluation in Section 5. Section 6
discusses several practical considerations of Carpool. Section 7
reviews related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 CHARACTERIZING HAND RESONANCE
In this section, we model our system using modal analysis, and
analyze the properties of hand resonance. Then, we conduct an ex-
periment to empirically validate the feasibility of hand resonance
based secure pairing.
2.1 Modal Analysis
A mechanical system’s resonant properties are determined by its
physical characteristics, including its mass, stiffness and damping.
A principal method to analyze the mechanical properties of a
system is to break it down into a set of connected elements.
In most cases, a mechanical system is modeled as a complex
multi-degree-of-freedom (MDoF) system, whose physical charac-
teristics are represented as matrices. A complex MDoF system
can be represented as the linear superposition of a number of
single degree-of-freedom (SDoF) characteristics. For simplicity,
we illustrate the mechanical properties using an SDoF model. As
presented by Fig. 1(a), an element can be characterized by an
infinitely rigid constant mass m with elasticity represented by an
ideal massless spring of constant stiffness k.
In the TAG system, the hand and the device can be modeled
as two elements. When the hand touches the device, the system
can be modeled as two elements with interactions, as depicted
in Fig. 1(b). Generally, external forces applied to the system can
be modeled as a force vector f =
[ f1
f2
]
, where f1(t), f2(t) are
external forces applied to the two elements, respectively. It is
worth noting that fi(t) = 0 when there is no external forces
applied to the corresponding element. The dynamic response of
k
m
(a) A system of a single
element.
k1
m1 m2
f1(t)
f2(t)
x1(t) x2(t)
(b) A system of two elements in physical contact.
Fig. 1. A simplified model of the TAG system. A device or hand can
be modeled as a single element. A hand and a touched device can be
modeled as two coupled elements.
the system under external forces is governed by the following
equation.
Mx¨+Kx = f , (1)
where x =
[ x1
x2
]
is the displacement vector, and the x¨ is the
second-order derivative of x. M =
[
m1 0
0 m2
]
is the mass matrix,
K =
[
k1+k1 −k2
−k2 k2
]
the stiffness matrix.
The displacements can be written in the form of Fourier
transforms:
xn(t) =
∑
ω
Xn(ω)e
iωt, n = 1, 2, (2)
where Xn(ω) is the Fourier coefficient of xn(t). In our system,
the vibration motor with frequency ω0 can be expressed in the
form of a δ function as follows.
fn(t) = Fn
∑
ω
eiωtδ(ω − ωn), n = 1, 2, (3)
where the δ function is defined by
δ(ω − ωn) =
{
1, ωn = ω
0, ωn 6= ω.
(4)
Taking (2) and (3) into (1), we yield
(K− ω2M)
[∑
ω X1(ω)∑
ω X2(ω)
]
=
[
F1
∑
ω δ(ω−ω1)
F2
∑
ω δ(ω−ω2)
]
. (5)
Based on (5), we can derive the frequency response function (FRF)
of each element in the system, which describes magnification
factors under the forces of different frequencies. The magnification
factor is defined to be the ratio of the steady-state displacement
response amplitude to the static displacement. As the closed-form
expression is quite complex, we illustrate the resonance properties
using a concrete example. We set k1 = 6, k2 = 3,m1 = 2,m2 =
1, f1(t) = 0, and f2(t) can be any single frequency force. In this
case, there is only one external force, e.g., the force generated by
a vibration motor, applied to m2, while there is no external force
applied to m1. It is worth noting that m1 is also affected by the
external force due to the stiffness between m1 and m2. The FRF
is depicted in Fig. 2.
The FRF plot provides the following observations.
• First, the resonance properties of the two elements are
consistent. Specifically, the resonant frequencies of the two
elements are completely aligned with each other, and the
antiresonant frequency of one element is roughly aligned
with the local minimum frequency of the other element.
• Second, there are as many resonant frequencies as the
number of DoFs in the system. Note that although we only
model one object as a SDoF with one element, the actual
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Fig. 2. An illustration of resonance properties in a system of two coupled
elements. We set k1 = 6, k2 = 3,m1 = 2,m2 = 1, f1(t) = 0.
(a) The TAG Prototype.
motor
wristbandacc
cubic
(b) Touch test.
Fig. 3. Prototype setup.
object is a MDoF system consisting of multiple elements.
In practice, there are many resonant frequencies in the
hand-device system.
These observations imply that the resonance properties can be
used as reciprocal information to generate enough secret bits for
secure pairing.
2.2 Feasibility Study
To validate the above observations, we designed a prototype as
shown in Fig. 3. The prototype consists of a wristband with a
triple-axis accelerometer, a cubic with a haptic vibration motor
and a triple-axis accelerometer. We use the InvenSense MPU-
6050 sensors as the accelerometers, which are equipped in many
commercial wearables and smartphones. The sampling rate of
accelerometers is 250 Hz. We use an Eccentric Rotating Mass
(ERM) motor, which is widely adopted in today’s smartphones.
We use an Arduino development board [8] to control the motor to
to sweep from 20 Hz to 125 Hz.
We ask participants to touch the cubic with the hand wearing
the wristband as depicted in Fig. 3(b), and in the meantime
the vibration motor generates sweep excitation signals. The ac-
celerometer data at both sensors are recorded and compared.
Fig. 4 illustrates the fast Fourier transform (FFT) of accelerometer
amplitudes in two touch trials. For both touch trials, we observe
that the resonant frequencies of the cubic and the wrist are well
aligned. Additionally, we observe that the resonant frequencies
in the two touch trials are different. Note that these two touch
trials are performed by the same person, while the touch postures,
strengths, and touch positions are slightly different. It indicates
that resonant frequencies are quite sensitive to how a user touches
an object, thereby making resonance a unique signature to each
touch trial.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first introduce the overall architecture of TAG.
To extract resonant properties, we carefully design the vibration
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Fig. 4. FFT of accelerometer data collected at the wristband and the
cubic.
excitation using a commercial vibration motor. To convert resonant
properties into reciprocal bit sequences, we preprocess accelerom-
eter data to remove noise and encode resonant frequencies. Rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification are employed to reduce the
bit mismatch rate without compromising security. We also analyze
the security of TAG under different attacks.
3.1 Overview
Fig. 5 gives an overview of TAG, which extracts reciprocal secrets
from hand resonance for secure pairing. TAG considers a scenario
where a user intends to establish a secure communication channel
between its wearable and another device. The user triggers this
pairing intent by touching the device. Then, the touched device
generates vibration signals via a vibration motor. The vibration
signals are designed to excite the device and the hand. As such,
the accelerometers on the wristband wearable and the device
can capture the vibration responses of the hand and the device,
respectively. The wearable and the device separately process
their own accelerometer data to extract reciprocal information
without any information exchange. The accelerometer data process
includes three steps: frequency response extraction, resonance
encoding, and reverse channel coding. The frequency response
extraction step screens out noise and disturbance caused by the
environment and hand movements; it then derives the desired
frequency responses for resonance analysis. After obtaining the
frequency responses, resonance and antiresonant frequencies are
identified and encoded in the resonance encoding step. The reverse
channel coding aims to reduce the discrepancies between the
encoded bits by the wearable and the device. In particular, the
original encoded bit sequences are considered as messages with a
limited number of errors, and are converted into shorter sequences
using a error correction code (FEC) decoder. The output of the
reverse channel coding is the reciprocal information shared by the
wearable and the device. It is worthwhile noting that in a complete
secret sharing protocol, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification are performed to extract more reliable secrets. The
reciprocal information is used to establish a secure channel. After
successful pairing, the wearable notifies the user by a specific
haptic feedback.
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Fig. 5. An overview of the TAG system.
3.2 Vibration Excitation
TAG is inspired by modal analysis in that resonance properties
can be derived by exciting the target object with forces of different
frequencies. To this end, TAG utilizes an ERM vibration motor as
the excitation source. ERM vibration motors are widely equipped
in today’s mobile devices to provide haptic feedback and vibration
notifications. The motors are supplied with DC power and rotate
an eccentric mass around an axis to create a centripetal force,
which causes the motors and the attached devices to vibrate. The
centripetal force is the external force applied to the hand-device
system, and can be expressed as
f(t) = mdω2 sin(ωt), (6)
where m is the eccentric mass, d the distance from the center
of gravity to the center of rotation, and ω the angular velocity
of the rotation. The motors tune the input voltage to control
the angular velocity ω, which determines the amplitude and the
frequency of the force. In practice, the analog sinusoidal waveform
is approximately generated with binary voltage levels using Pulse
Width Modulation (PMW). In particular, PMW modulates the
duty cycles of the DC power to simulate a voltage between the
DC power voltage and zero voltage. In our system, we generate
the vibration excitation by controlling the duty cycles of the
DC power. Specifically, we gradually increase the duty cycles to
generate forces with sweeping frequencies. Fig. 6 gives a visual
illustration of the our vibration excitation. The vibration excitation
is measured using an accelerometer. The unit of y-axis is g/216,
where g stands for the gravitational acceleration.
The frequency range needs to be selected carefully to obtain
resonance properties. Previous studies [9], [10] have reported that
the natural frequencies of the human hand-arm systems range from
several Hertz to hundreds of Hertz. Therefore, a subset of the
resonant frequencies of the hand-device system fall within this
range. Apparently, the wider frequency range we select, the more
complete resonance properties we can obtain. However, the max-
imal frequency that can be captured by an accelerometer is gated
by its sampling rate. According to the Nyquist sampling theory,
a sensor at f sampling rate can capture signals at frequencies
no more than f/2. As most of the accelerometers equipped in
today’s mobile devices support up to 400 Hz sampling rates, the
maximal frequency is gated by 200 Hz. In addition, there is a
tradeoff between the frequency range and the vibration duration.
For a given frequency sweeping speed, the vibration duration
is proportional to the frequency range. In our implementation,
we select 20-125 Hz as the frequency range, which manages to
generate secret bits comparable to a 4-digit PIN code.
The speed of frequency sweeping determines the duration of
one touch trial. We aim to set the sweeping speed as fast as
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Fig. 6. An illustration of vibration excitation.
possible to minimize the touch duration. The limit of the sweep
speed is gated by the transient state duration. When an external
force changes its frequency, the forced system needs a short period
of time before reaching the steady state. Note that we can only
accurately obtain the resonance properties when the system is in
the steady state. However, it is hard to identify which part of the
accelerometer data is collected in the steady state, as the duration
and patterns of the transient state depend on many confounding
factors. For each vibration frequency, the collected accelerometer
data contains two parts: the data in the transient state and the data
in the steady state. To amortize the impact of the transient state,
the vibration motor is set to stay for enough time before increasing
its frequency. As such, the amount of data in the steady state is
dominant and the overall data retains strong resonant properties.
We empirically evaluate the system under various durations and
set the motor to sweep from 20 Hz to 125 Hz within 1.75 s, which
eliminates the impact of the transient state.
3.3 Frequency Response Extraction
To extract resonant properties, we first need to derive the frequency
response of the hand-device system from the raw accelerometer
data. We observe that the accelerometer data at low frequencies
is largely polluted by motion artifacts. In practice, it is inevitable
that the hand moves during the pairing process. The acceleration
caused by motion is usually much larger than vibration-induced
acceleration, thereby making it hard to extract vibration-induced
acceleration. Fortunately, the frequencies of motion artifacts con-
centrate at low frequencies of several Hertz [11], [12]. Hence,
we set the minimal vibration frequency to over 20 Hz to avoid
overlapping with hand motion frequencies. As such, we only
extract resonant properties in the vibration frequency range where
motion artifacts are negligible.
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Fig. 7. Local variance removal.
Recall that although the resonant frequencies of different
elements match each other, their responses at other frequencies
are not identical, as illustrated in Fig. 2. These mismatches in real
systems are much more complex, and lead to local variances which
might mislead the resonant frequency identification. Fig. 7(a)
illustrates the frequency response collected in one touch trial. We
observe that there are multiple peaks near one resonant frequency.
Thus, these local variances should be mitigated before performing
resonance encoding. To this end, we use a moving-average filter to
eliminate these local variances. The results after filtering is shown
in Fig. 7(b), where the smoothing window is set to be 10 samples.
3.4 Resonance Encoding
Resonance encoding translates the frequency response into a se-
quence of bits. After local variance removal, we obtain two highly
similar curves in the frequency domain. To encode frequency
responses, we have the following alternative options: 1) encod-
ing the amplitudes of the frequency response by quantizing the
amplitude of each frequency or frequency segment into multiple
levels; 2) encoding the shape of the frequency response curve
by classifying the curve of each frequency segment into several
predefined shapes, such as ascending and descending shapes; and
3) encoding the positions of resonant and antiresonant frequencies.
Although the first and second options can preserve most of the
information, they are inapplicable in our case. As we observe in
Fig. 4, the amplitudes of the two frequency responses are not
coincidental. Thus, amplitude quantization would introduce many
mismatches, which would lead to a high failure rate in pairing.
The shape-based encoding faces a similar issue, as the two curves
do not coincide in non-resonant frequency ranges. Therefore, we
turn to the third option that encodes the resonant and antiresonant
frequencies to ensure the matching rate.
Our encoding algorithm consists of two steps: resonant and
antiresonant frequencies identification and modulation. We use
local maxima and minima in the frequency response to identify
the resonant and antiresonant frequencies. We employ a sliding
window to move across the whole frequency range, and find all
the extrema (i.e., maxima or minima) in each sliding window. Note
that there may be multiple extrema near one resonant or antires-
onant frequency due to local variances. We observe that resonant
frequencies are separate from each other by at least 10 Hz. To
avoid repetitive extrema, we select at most one maximum and
minimum in each sliding window of 10 Hz. In particular, if there
are multiple minima or maxima in one sliding window, we select a
winner based on amplitude and discard the others. After scanning
the whole frequency response, the frequencies of all extrema are
marked as resonant or antiresonant frequencies.
Then, we modulate these frequency locations into a sequence
of bits. An intuitive method is to quantify frequencies and encode
these frequency levels. However, this encoding method leaks
certain information as it has predictable patterns. The order of
resonant frequencies (e.g., in an ascending or descending order)
must be preset so that the two sides can derive the same sequence
of bits, which leaks information in the encoded bit sequence.
For example, if the resonant frequencies are encoded in an
ascending order in the bit sequence, eavesdroppers know that
the first codeword in the bit sequence is likely to be small as
it corresponds to the minimal resonant frequency. To avoid such
information leakage, we encode the relative locations rather than
the absolute locations of resonant frequencies. First, we divide the
whole frequency range into N segments. Then, we encode the
relative locations of resonant and antiresonant frequencies in the
corresponding segment that covers the frequencies, as illustrated
in Fig. 8. To encode relative locations in a segment, we evenly
divide a segment into m subsegments, and quantify the frequency
locations based on these subsegments. Segments without resonant
or antiresonant frequencies are encoded as R0 or A0. In our
implementation, we use two bits to encode the relative locations in
a segment. We divide each segment into three subsegments and use
“01”, “11”, and “10” to encode frequencies in these subsegments.
We setR0 andA0 to be “00” to encode segments without resonant
or antiresonant frequencies. If there are multiple resonant (or
antiresonant) frequencies in one segment, we select the frequency
with higher (or lower) amplitude for encoding. Empirical results
show that there are 4-8 resonant (or antiresonant) frequencies in
20-125 Hz. Hence, we divide the frequency range into 6 segments.
3.5 Synchronization
Traditional key generation schemes require synchronization of two
devices to ensure that the bits obtained by one device corresponds
to the same time instants as the bits of the other. Synchronization
is fairly simple in TAG as the secret bits are obtained from the
frequency domain instead of the time domain. Even if the two
devices obtain the accelerometer data in different time window,
the resonance features extracted by the two devices can still match.
Therefore, the synchronization scheme in our design is only to
ensure that the data captured by the two devices are within the
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Fig. 8. An illustration of resonance encoding. The relative location of
each resonant or antiresonant frequency in its segment is encoded. The
encoded bit sequence C consists of encoded locations of resonant fre-
quencies {Ri} and antiresonant frequencies {Aj}. Segments without
resonance or antiresonance are encoded as R0 or A0.
vibration duration. We can achieve such a coarse synchronization
using the pairing request packet. In particular, when a device
intents to connect with the other device, it sends a pairing request
to the other and triggers the motor. At the meantime, both devices
records the accelerometer data to extract bits from the frequency
responses.
3.6 Reconciliation
After resonant encoding, the wearable and the device derive n-
bit sequences, denoted as Cw and Cd, respectively. Due to noise
and mismatched local variances, Cw and Cd may differ at certain
bits with a bit mismatch rate . Reconciliation is required to
alleviate the discrepancies of the secret bits between the two
legitimate devices. As both bit sequences are derived from the
resonance of the same system, they can be viewed as two different
distorted versions of the same signal. Thus, by employing an
error-correcting code (ECC) [13], we can drastically reduce bit
mismatch rate at the cost of bit rate.
In particular, we treat the n-bit sequences Cw and Cd as two
distorted versions of an n-bit codeword Co in an (n, k) ECC
C, which encodes a k-bit message into an n-bit code using an
encoding function f(·). It is worth noting that the reconciliation
reversely use the concept of RCC, that is, the n-bit sequences Cw
and Cd are the original messages but are treated as codewords
with errors. The wearable first derives the codeword Co by
Co = f(f
−1(Cw)), where f−1(·) denotes the decoding function
of C. Then the wearable sends the difference δ = Co ⊕ Cw,
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise logic operation XOR, to the touched
device in cleartext via data communication channel such as Wi-Fi
or Bluetooth. The touched device deduces Cw by
Cw = δ ⊕ f(f−1(δ ⊕ Cd)). (7)
The ECC C should provide enough error correction ability to
ensure Cw = Cw with high probability. The rationale behind this
is that, the decoding function f−1(·) maps any n-bit sequence
Ci to a k-bit message M whose corresponding encoding result
f(M) is the codeword closest to Ci. According to the definition
of δ, δ⊕Cw equals to Co, and thus the bit mismatch rate between
δ⊕Cd and Co equals to the , i.e., the bit mismatch rate between
Cw and Cd. Given an ECC C with an enough error correction
ability to tolerate  bit mismatch rate, f(f−1(δ ⊕ Cd)) equals to
Co with high probability, which in turn makes Cw = Cw with
high probability.
3.7 Privacy Amplification
As the ECC C is assumed to be public and the difference δ is
transmitted via an insecure communication channel, which may
leak partial information about Cw to eavesdroppers. Although
eavesdroppers cannot directly infer Cw by observing δ, they can
narrow down the search space based on the knowledge that δ⊕Cw
corresponds a certain codeword in C. In particular, the above
reconciliation process leaks n − k bits of information about the
n-bit sequence Cw. To avoid such partial information leakage, we
take a privacy amplification step by removing n − k bits out of
the Cw. Specifically, we use f−1(Cw) as the secret bit sequence,
which is completely secure to eavesdroppers.
3.8 Security Analysis
We analyze the security performance of TAG under different
attack scenarios. Both passive and active attacks are discussed
below.
3.8.1 Eavesdropping
Eavesdroppers are assumed to be able to overhear all communica-
tions between wearable and touched devices. In TAG, the only
communication during pairing is sending δ from the wearable
to the device via their data communication channel, such as
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Recall that the partial information leakage
by transmitting δ can be completely avoided by reducing the
size of the secret bit sequence in the privacy amplification step.
Therefore, eavesdroppers can learn nothing about the secret bits
by overhearing the data communication channel.
As vibration signals emitted by the motor propagate in solids,
e.g., the desk in contact with the touched object, and over the air,
eavesdroppers may also try to obtain information about the secret
bits by overhearing these physical channels using accelerometers
or microphones. To validate TAG against such eavesdroppers,
we evaluate the information leakage through physical channels
through a set of experiments in Section 5.
3.8.2 Denial-of-Service (DoS)
DoS attackers aim to make the pairing fail by preventing the
communications between the wearable and the touched device.
In particular, DoS attackers can stress the data communication
channel to avoid the successful reception of δ during the recon-
ciliation step. To protect TAG against such DoS attacks, we set a
maximum number of attempts and a timeout to transmit δ. Once
the number of transmission attempts or the time reaches the limit,
TAG uses Cw and Cd as the secrets without reconciliation. The
pairing performance of TAG without reconciliation is evaluated in
Section 5 to demonstrate the effectiveness under DoS attacks.
3.8.3 Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
MITM attackers intercept the packets transmitted by the wearable
and the touched device, and deliver false messages to the receiver.
In TAG, since the data communication channel between the
wearable and the touched device is an unauthenticated channel
during pairing, an MITM attacker can impersonate as the sender
during the reconciliation step. As such, an MITM attacker spoofs a
legitimate device and alter δ to disrupt the pairing process without
revealing its presence. As attackers have no knowledge about Cw
or Cd, we can extract a “fingerprint” from Cw or Cd to verify
the integrity of δ. The fingerprint can be a fraction of Cw or Cd,
or a shorter message derived from Cw or Cd. We employ the
message authentication code (MAC) scheme in [14] to generate
the fingerprint.
73.8.4 Relay Attack
Relay attackers initiate the pairing process and relay messages be-
tween the wearable and the touched device without manipulating
them. In TAG, the secrets are never transmitted over the air and
are only accessible to devices in contact with the hand. Thus, even
relay attackers can successful relay all messages during the pairing
process, they cannot obtain the secrets used for packet encryption.
4 EXPERIMENT DESIGN
This section presents our experimental setup, the basic information
about enrolled participants, and the detailed procedure of perform-
ing experiments.
4.1 Experimental Setup
To validate the TAG system, we conducted experiments using an
experimental prototype as depicted in Fig. 3. The prototype uses
an Arduino OCROBOT Mango II development board to control
an ERM vibration motor, and an Arduino UNO development
board to collect acceleration data from two InvenSense MPU-6050
sensors. The vibration motor and one accelerometer is attached to
an object, while the other accelerometer is worn on the wrist of the
participant using a wristband. To simulate the scenario of mobile
payment, we use a cubic box as the mobile payment end. The
cubic size is 6.3 in (length) × 3.8 in (width) × 1.9 in (height),
as shown in Fig. 3(b). In addition, we also attach sensors to a
smartphone, a mouse, and a cup as the touched objects.
The maximal input voltage of the ERM motor is 3.3 V.
We developed an application to control the input voltage of the
motor using PWM. The vibration amplitudes and frequencies of
the motor under different voltages are measured and shown in
Fig. 9. The sampling rate of the accelerometer sensors is set to
be 250 Hz to capture all vibration responses. The acceleration
data is collected via an Arduino board and processed offline using
MATLAB R2014b.
We use an iPhone 5s as an acoustic eavesdropper that records
vibration-induced sound through its built-in microphone. The
iPhone 5s is placed in the proximity of 1-36 inches away from the
motor. We use the built-in microphone to record acoustic signals
during our experiments with a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz. The
recorded data during each touch trial is uploaded to a PC, and
is processed using the same algorithm to infer the bit sequence
derived from the acceleration data. We use an InvenSense MPU-
6050 sensor to eavesdrop vibration signal leakage along the desk.
The accelerometer is placed in the proximity of 1-11 inches away
from the motor. The experiment environment is in a quiet office
so that vibration-induced acoustic signals are not overwhelmed by
background noise. The sound pressure level (SPL) of the office
during our experiments is around 40-50 dB.
4.2 Enrolled Participants
We invite 12 volunteers, whose basic information is listed in
Table 1. The participants include 5 females and 7 males, with ages
ranging from 23 to 31. We specifically select subjects to cover a
wide range of wrist circumferences and body mass indices (BMI).
Wrist circumference and BMI are import physical attributes re-
lated to hand vibrations, as our system should be robust for users of
different physical attributes. In particular, the wrist circumferences
range from 5.51 inches to 7.48 inches, and BMI ranges from 17.5
to 27.70.
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Fig. 9. Specifications of our ERM motor.
TABLE 1
Basic information of volunteer subjects. The subjects are ordered
based on their wrist circumferences.
Subject Gender Age Wrist circumference BMI
1 F 28 5.51 in 20.8
2 F 24 5.55 in 17.5
3 F 28 5.67 in 18.1
4 F 24 5.82 in 22.0
5 F 23 6.02 in 21.8
6 M 25 6.29 in 22.3
7 M 28 6.38 in 24.69
8 M 29 6.50 in 22.83
9 M 27 6.73 in 21.80
10 M 23 6.89 in 24.90
11 M 27 6.97 in 27.70
12 M 31 7.48 in 27.13
4.3 Procedure
Prior to touch trials. The touched object was placed on a desk
in our office. An iPhone 5s was placed on the same desk at a
distance of 6 inches away from the object to eavesdrop on the
acoustic signals leaked from the vibration. Note that we varied
the distances in our security validation experiment. In addition,
we place an accelerometer on the desk near the touched object
to act as an accelerometer-based eavesdropper. Prior to starting
touch trials, we demonstrated the performance of different touch
postures. We performed four touch postures, including palm touch,
fist touch, border touch, and corner touch, to touch different areas
of the object, as illustrated in Fig. 10.
Performing touch trials. Each participant were asked to wear
a wristband equipped with an accelerometer on its preferred hand,
and use that hand to touch the object. Seven participants chose to
wear the wristband on their left hands while five others chose to
wear it on their right hands. The wearing locations of the wristband
were based on the participants’ own habits of wearing watches or
wrist wearables. Then, each participants was asked to perform four
different touch postures as we demonstrated in Fig. 10. We only
showed different contact areas of these touch postures without
specific requirements for touch strength, or detailed hand/arm
gestures. The participants were asked to repeat each touch posture
30 times. One touch trial lasted 1.75s, during which the motor
vibrated with sweeping frequencies from 20 Hz to 125 Hz, while
the iPhone 5s used its built-in microphone to records acoustic
signals. The participants were allowed a small rest period of
around 5 s between trials of a posture, and a longer break of
10-30 s between different postures. We yielded a dataset with
1440 trials, where each participant contributed 120 trials. We
8(a) Palm touch. (b) Fist touch. (c) Border touch. (d) Corner touch.
Fig. 10. Touch postures.
collected additional trials from 4 participants in controlled settings
to study the impact of vibration durations and wearing locations.
Each participant performed 30 trials in each vibration duration and
wearing location setting.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of TAG. Evaluation
metrics are explained, and the pairing and security performance is
presented. We also validate our system using different objects as
the touched device.
5.1 Evaluation Metrics
We employ the following metrics to evaluate the performance of
our system.
• Bit rate. We use bit rate to measure how fast we can
generate reciprocal information from resonant properties.
Given the number of secret bits (13.29 bits for a 4-digit
PIN code) required for pairing, a higher bit rate indicates
a shorter time needed for pairing. In our system, bit
rate depends on the vibration duration and the encoding
scheme. Recall that the vibration duration is gated by the
period of the transient state. The vibration duration should
be long enough so that the effect of the transient state does
not overwhelm the resonant properties in the steady state.
• Bit mismatch rate. Bit mismatch rate is defined as the
ratio of mismatched bits to the total number of gener-
ated bits. A lower bit mismatch rate indicates a higher
probability that the wearable and the device generate the
exact same sequence of bits. The bit mismatch rate is
also affected by the vibration duration and the encoding
scheme. There is a tradeoff between bit mismatch rate and
bit rate. Longer vibration duration yields stronger resonant
properties, thereby achieving lower bit mismatch rate at
the cost of lower bit rate. We need to identify the optimal
vibration duration that delivers the highest bit rate while
maintaining strong resonant properties for encoding.
• Entropy. Entropy measures the average amount of in-
formation contained in a message [15]. The entropy
of a random variable X is computed by H(X) =
−∑ni=1 Pr[xi] log2 Pr[xi], where Pr[xi] is the proba-
bility of X’s possible value xi. In our evaluation, we
compute entropy per segment to measure the uncertainty
of the generated secret bits. The probability of each bit is
computed by counting its frequency in repeated trials. The
secret bits with higher entropy contain more information,
and are harder for eavesdroppers to infer.
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Fig. 11. Bit mismatch rates and bit rates under various vibration dura-
tions.
• Mutual information. Mutual information is a measure of
the amount of information about one random variable
obtained through another random variable [15]. We use
mutual information to measure the information leakage in
our system. Less mutual information between two random
variables X and Y indicates that one can learn less about
X by observing Y . Mutual information close to zero
between the bit sequences obtained by the eavesdropper
and those of the wearable or the device indicates that the
eavesdropper is unable to obtain any useful information
about the bit sequences generated from resonant proper-
ties.
5.2 Pairing Performance
This section studies the pairing performance of our system in
terms of bit mismatch rate and bit rate. First, we conducted a
set of micro-benchmark experiments to evaluate the impact of
different settings. We varied the vibration durations to find an
optimal duration for one touch trial (Fig. 11). In order to test
the robustness of our system, we asked participants to wear the
wristband at different locations (Fig. 12). Then, we followed
the setup as described in Section 4.3 and obtained the overall
performance across all participants (Table 2 and Fig. 13).
A key factor that affects the bit mismatch rates and bit rates is
the vibration duration. We need to identify the optimal vibration
duration that minimizes the negative impact of the transient state
to achieve desired bit mismatch rate with the maximal bit rate.
To this end, we empirically study the performance under various
vibration durations as shown in Fig. 11. The results of encod-
ing schemes with and without reconciliation are illustrated. The
scheme without reconciliation is adopted under DoS attacks, while
the scheme with reconciliation is adopted under eavesdropping or
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Fig. 12. Bit mismatch rates with different wearing locations.
MITM attacks. We employ the (12,23) Golay code as the ECC
in the reconciliation step. The results show that the bit mismatch
rates diminish quickly when the vibration duration is larger than
1.5 s, while the improvement is minimal when we further extend
the duration beyond 1.75 s. The results imply that the vibration
duration of 1.75 s is long enough to extract reliable bits at a rate
of 13.71 bit/s for the scheme without reconciliation and 7.15 bit/s
for the scheme with reconciliation. The bit rate in our system
outperforms that of the conventional PIN code input, whose bit
rate is 4.96 bit/s, according to the experiments in [7]. In the
following evaluation, we set the vibration duration to 1.75 s.
In real scenarios, the wearing locations of wrist wearables
vary among users. In our experiments, the wristband is put on
locations according to participants’ habits of wearing watches or
wearables. Before proceeding to the results under this uncontrolled
wearing setting, we conduct a separate experiment in which we
intentionally vary the locations of the wristband to investigate
the robustness of our system. We ask participants to place the
wristband close to their wrist joints (location 1), and move the
wristband 0.5 inch (location 2), 1 inch (location 3), 1.5 inches
(location 4), and 2 inches (location 5) away from their wrist joints.
Fig. 12 shows that the bit mismatch rates of the scheme without
reconciliation increase slightly when the wearing location moves
away from the wrist joint, while those of the scheme with reconcil-
iation stay below 1.7% across all locations. The reason behind the
results is that the vibration amplitudes of the hand resonance decay
when propagating along the forearm, thereby making it harder to
accurately identify the resonant and antiresonant frequencies at
the wristband. Fortunately, as the bit mismatch rates are still lower
than 6%, the scheme with reconciliation can still correct most of
these errors. Moreover, the cases where wearables are worn more
than 1 inch away from the wrist joint are quite rare. We observe
that most participants naturally worn the wristband in the range
between location 1 and location 2.
The overall performance with 1.75 s vibration duration and
uncontrolled wearing locations are given in Table 2 and Fig. 13.
The bit mismatch rates of different touch postures are summarized
in Table 2. The palm and fist touch postures achieve zero bit
mismatch rate under the encoding scheme with reconciliation,
while the corner touch posture performs worst of all. The reason
behind the results is that palm and fist touch postures provide
larger touch areas and thus lead to stronger resonance, while the
corner touch posture provides the smallest touch area. The bit
mismatch rates of all touch postures are consistently low, which
indicates the usability of the touch-based secure pairing.
Fig. 13 shows the bit mismatch rates across all participants,
whose basic information is listed in Table 1. On the whole, our
TABLE 2
Bit mismatch rates of different touch postures.
Palm Fist Border Corner
w/o reconciliation 1.13% 0.57% 2.1% 3.9%
w/ reconciliation 0 0.04% 0.39% 0.43%
Fig. 13. Bit mismatch rates of all participants.
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system achieves bit mismatch rates of 0.216% and 1.932% for
the scheme with and without the reconciliation, respectively. This
reveals that our system without reconciliation still maintains a
very low bit mismatch rate of less than 2% under DoS attacks.
For the complete scheme, i.e., the scheme with the reconciliation,
the successful rate of secure pairing for all trials is 97.7%, which
indicates that generated bit sequences in 97.7% of the trials are
completely matched. The average number of trials needed for
successful pairing is 1.023. It is worth noting that the results
are comparable to other secure pairing techniques [7], [16]–[18].
We also observe that for subjects with large wrist circumferences
(subjects 9-12), the pairing performance without reconciliation
is worse on average compared to those of subjects with small
circumferences. The reason behind this is that the vibration signals
better propagate on thinner hands and wrists, thereby resulting in
higher signal to noise ratio at the wristband.
5.3 Security Validation
This section evaluates the security performance of our system.
To ensure the reciprocal information obtained from the resonant
properties is substantially unpredictable, we first measure the
randomness of generated bits. Then, we study the information
leakage under acoustic eavesdropping attack and accelerometer-
based eavesdropping attack.
5.3.1 Randomness
Fig. 14 measures the normalized numbers of resonant and an-
tiresonant frequencies falling into each segment. The numbers per
segment are counted based on all trials in our experiments. We
observe that the normalized frequencies are comparable to each
other, except for that of the antiresonant frequency in segment 6.
The reason is that we may miss the antiresonant frequencies when
they are near the highest vibration frequency. Nevertheless, most
resonant and antiresonant frequencies are randomly distributed in
different segments with comparable probabilities. This indicates
that we yield reasonable randomness through our segment-based
encoding scheme.
We further quantify the randomness of the reciprocal informa-
tion using entropy. Fig. 15(a) measures the entropy per segment of
the bit sequences directly derived from the resonant properties
without reconciliation. The code index represents each of the
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Fig. 15. Entropy of generated bits.
12 codes that encode the resonant and antiresonant locations, as
illustrated in Fig. 8. We observe that the entropies of most codes
approach two, which is the theoretical upper-bound. The entropy
of code 12 is lower as we miss some antiresonant frequencies
in the last segment due to the limitation in vibration frequency.
Fig. 15(b) shows the entropy per bit after applying reconciliation.
We see that the entropies of all bits approach the theoretical upper-
bound, i.e., 1, indicating high randomness of the generated bits.
In addition, we employ the standard randomness test suite from
NIST [19] to examine the randomness level of secret bits after
the reconciliation. The NIST statistical test suite assumes a null
hypothesis that the input bit sequences are random and computes
the p-values of a set of random test processes. If the p-value is
less than a significant level, which is conventionally set to be 1%,
the null hypothesis is rejected, implying that the bit sequences are
not random. Table 3 summarizes the results of the NIST tests.
The results show that all the p-values are larger than 1%, which
indicates that the generated bit sequences in TAG pass the NIST
tests.
TABLE 3
NIST Statistical Test Suite Results.
Test P-value
Frequency 0.350485
Block Frequency 0.739918
Cumulative Sums 0.213309
Cumulative Sums 0.534146
Runs 0.350485
Longest Run 0.213329
FFT 0.035174
Approximate Entropy 0.534146
Serial 0.213309
Serial 0.122325
5.3.2 Acoustic Eavesdropping Attack
In order to evaluate the information leakage to acoustic eavesdrop-
pers, we first compare the raw frequency responses obtained by the
wearable, the device, and the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper’s
measurements are downsampled to match the acceleration data.
Fig. 16 shows pairwise scatterplots of the measurements collected
by the three entities. The intuitive meaning of the visual results
is that the measurements of the wearable and the device are well
aligned with each other, while the eavesdropper’s measurements
are uncorrelated with those of the wearable or device. The fun-
damental reason behind the results is that the subtle vibrations
of the hand and object incur extremely small sound, which
is overwhelmed by surrounding noise and the acoustic signals
generated by the motor.
To quantify how much information an eavesdropper can learn
from its measurements, we empirically compute the mutual infor-
mation between the bits derived by the three entities using the
same encoding scheme. Fig. 17 shows the mutual information
under various eavesdropping distances. Eavesdroppers at different
distances obtain a negligible amount of information about the
wearable’s and the device’s measurements. The mutual informa-
tion between the eavesdropper and the wearable (device) is less
than 0.01, which indicates that the eavesdropper can learn less than
0.01 bit for 1 bit of the wearable’s (device’s) bit sequences. Fig. 18
measures the mutual information under different touch postures.
The results are consistent with Fig. 17, in that the eavesdropper
can learn less than 1% information about the wearable’s and the
device’s bit sequences.
5.3.3 Accelerometer-based Eavesdropping Attack
In some pairing cases, such as mobile payment, the touched
object is placed on a desk. The vibration signals generated in
TAG not only propagate over the air as acoustic signals, but
also propagate along the desk. To evaluate the leakage along the
desk, we place an accelerometer sensor on the desk 1-11 inches
in the proximity of the motor. The same algorithm is employed
by the pairing devices and the eavesdropper to extract bits from
the measured accelerometer data. Fig. 19 compares the mutual
information between the pairing devices and the eavesdropper. We
observe that the mutual information between the eavesdropper at
distance of 1 inch and a legitimate device is 0.38, while it quickly
drops below 0.15 when the eavesdropper is 3 inches or further
away from the motor. When the mutual information is below 0.15,
the bit mismatch rate between the eavesdropper and legitimate
devices are as high as over 44%. Thus, we conclude that TAG is
safe against accelerometer-based eavesdroppers at distances over
3 inches. As unauthenticated devices within 3 inches can be easily
identified, 3 inches is a reasonably safe distance.
5.4 Different Objects
To test the feasibility of our system on different objects, we
extend our experiments by using an additional set of objects as
the touched devices, as shown in Fig. 21. The participants are
asked to hold the smartphone or the mouse in their hands wearing
the wristband. The cup is placed on the desk and the participants
are asked to touch the area of the side. Other settings are the
same as described in Section 4.3. Fig. 22 shows the bit mismatch
rates of different objects. The performance varies among different
objects due to their different levels of resonant properties in the
vibration frequency range. For all objects, the scheme without
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Fig. 16. Comparisons of frequency response measurements. Amplitudes of each frequency is compared and plotted. We use the dataset of all
trials. The eavesdropper is 6 inches away.
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Fig. 17. Mutual information under different eavesdropping distances.
The attacker uses microphone for eavesdropping.
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Fig. 18. Mutual information under different touch postures. The attacker
uses microphone for eavesdropping.
reconciliation achieves bit mismatch rates lower than 5%, and the
scheme with reconciliation achieves bit mismatch rates lower than
0.5%, indicating the feasibility of our system on these objects.
6 DISCUSSION
This section discusses upper layer security protocols that can be
used in TAG, and security limitations of TAG.
6.1 Security Protocols
We investigated the feasibility of generating shared secret bits
from the resonant properties of the hand and the touched object.
This provides an intuitive means to securely pair a wristband
wearable with another device. The focus of this paper is to
generate shared secret bits from both sides, which is a common
and essential step of most secure pairing protocols. Our system
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Fig. 19. Mutual information under different eavesdropping distances.
The attacker uses accelerometer for eavesdropping.
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Fig. 20. Mutual information under different touch postures. The attacker
uses accelerometer for eavesdropping.
can be applied to different secure pairing protocols, including
PIN-based authentication, two-factor authentication, and secret
key based encryption. In particular, the secret bits generated from
hand resonance can be used as the PIN code shared by both sides,
a proof of physical contact for the two-factor authentication, or a
basis to generate the secret key.
6.2 Visual Eavesdroppers
While we have empirically demonstrated that our system is
resistant to acoustic eavesdroppers in proximity, it has certain
limitations. Although the subtle vibrations of hand resonance are
too small to be captured by microphones, it might be recovered by
high-speed cameras. A recent study [20] has successfully recov-
ered acoustic signals from vibrations using high-speed cameras.
Although the vibrations of hand resonance are weaker than audible
sounds as in [20], it is still possible for a high-speed camera to
12
(a) Cubic box. (b) Smartphone. (c) Mouse. (d) Glass cup.
Fig. 21. Different objects as the touched device.
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Fig. 22. Bit mismatch rates of different objects.
recognize the subtle vibrations of hand resonance and recover the
measurements of the accelerometers. Our main argument to this
problem is that our system is still safe against general shoulder
surfers using eyes or normal-speed cameras, which are threats to
conventional PIN code methods. One simple defense to high-speed
cameras is to block the line of sight. For example, we can use the
other hand to cover the hand performing the pairing, much as we
do to avoid shoulder surfers when typing our passwords.
7 RELATED WORK
Secure pairing. Short-range communication techniques such as
Bluetooth and NFC are commonly used by today’s applications
and devices for pairing as well as the following data communi-
cations. However, it is very challenging to enable secure pairing
for wearables using NFC or Bluetooth due to their broadcasting
nature. As a wearable normally pair with another device in a peer-
to-peer fashion, we lack of a trusted authority for key management
that allows two legitimate devices to agree on a common secret
key before communication. To address this predicament, there
are many studies leveraging auxiliary channels to generate shared
secrets. The shared secrets can be generated from user interactions,
auxiliary channels, or authenticated with user actions or auxiliary
channel. Examples of the former include gesture-based authentica-
tion [7], [21] that encodes authentication information as gestures
defined by authenticators or users, and the techniques that require
users to simultaneously provide the same drawings [22] or shaking
trajectories [23]. The auxiliary channel based approaches leverage
a special channel to create shared secrets. Many studies use
ambient environments, such as ambient sound [16], [24], and radio
environment [25], [26], as the proof of physical proximity. The
auxiliary channel itself is also leveraged as the source to generate
shared secrets. Normally, the two devices send messages to each
other within a short time to measure the channel between them.
Electromyography (EMG) sensors are leveraged in [29] to capture
the electrical activities caused by human muscle contractions,
which are encoded into secret bits to pair devices in contact with
one hand. Liu et al. [18], [30] use the channel sate information
(CSI) as shared secrets. Wang et al. wang2018securing exploit
the on-body creeping wave propagation to authenticate on-body
wearables and implant devices using commercial Bluetooth traces.
Different from these approaches, this paper exploits a new and
intuitive method that generates shared secrets through hand reso-
nance. The advantages of TAG lie in its intuitive user interaction,
and the ubiquity of the required sensors, i.e., vibration motors and
accelerometers, in today’s wearables.
Several recent advances [31], [32] have proposed using vibra-
tion signals to generate shared secrets for physically connected
devices. However, vibration signals leak over the air and can be
captured by acoustic eavesdroppers. Walkie-Talkie [33] generates
secret keys for on-body devices based on gait features, which
are extracted from accelerometer data. It is designed for multiple
body-worn devices in walking scenarios.
Vibration-based applications. Vibration properties of objects
have been exploited to enable different applications. Ono et al. [34]
develop a touch sensing technique that recognizes a rich context of
touch postures based on the resonant changes when users change
their touch postures and positions. SoQr [35] estimates the amount
of content inside a container based on the vibration responses to
acoustic excitations. Yang et al. [5] study the vibration properties
of different persons, and design a wristband wearable to recognize
household people based on their vibration properties. This paper
is inspired by these studies, and takes it one step further in that
we exploit the resonant properties of two objects (a hand and its
touched device) in physical contact to facilitate secure pairing.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper presents TAG, a new and intuitive approach to enable
secure pairing for wearables. The insight is that a hand and
its touched object form a system whose resonant properties are
shared by both sides. We build a prototype to extract shared
secrets from the resonant properties using commercial vibration
motors and accelerometers. The ubiquity of vibration motors and
accelerometers in today’s smart devices maximizes the chance
of widespread acceptance of our system. We demonstrate the
feasibility of our system by evaluating it with 12 participants.
We collect 1440 trials in total and the results show that we can
generate secret bits at a rate of 7.15 bit/s with merely 0.216% bit
mismatch rate.
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